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THE POSITION OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERN-
MENTS BEFORE THE COURTS OF
FOREIGN STATES
N. D. HOUGHTON*
The term "unrecognized government" is here used to desig-
nate a government which has not been granted political recog-
nition in any degree by the executive branch of the government
whose courts are called upon to exercise jurisdiction in cases
in which its status is involved, that is, a government which has
not been recognized by the executive as either a de jure govern-
ment or a de facto government.' British courts have refused
to distinguish between the two degrees of recognition, holding
both to be equally significant, so far as their legal effect is con-
cerned.2 It does not appear that the United States Supreme
Court has concerned itself definitely with any distinction,
though the New York Supreme Court has indicated that it con-
* See p. 544 for biographical note.
'Recognition of belligerency does not constitute political recognition
in any degree. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176 (1878); Hickman v.
Jones, 9 Wall. 197 (1870); Prats v. United States, Moore, Arbitrations,
Vol. III, p. 2886 (1871). See also Crandall, S. B., "Principles of Inter-
national Law Applied by the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission," 4 Am.
Jour. Int. Law 806; and see the Opinion of the Commission in Sen. Doc.
No. 25, 58th Cong., 2d sess.
2 Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. D. 497 (1887) ; Luther
v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K. B. 532 (1921); and Baty, Thomas, "So-called 'De
Facto' Recognition," 31 Yale Law Jour. 469.
3 See Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1 (1869); Williams v. Bruffy, 96
U. S. 176 (1877); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897); Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918).
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sidered that no distinction in legal effect could properly be
made. 4
From the opening of the nineteenth century, it has been the
practically unbroken policy of both British and American courts
to consider themselves definitely bound by the attitude of the
executive in the matter of the political status of foreign gov-
ernments.5 In 1819, Judge Johnson, of the United States Cir-
cuit Court for South Carolina, stated that, "courts exercising
jurisdiction of international law may often be called upon to
deduce the fact of national independence from history, evidence,
or public notoriety where there has been no formal recognition."'"
And in 1825, Chief Justice Best, of the British Court of Com-
mon Pleas, seemed willing to admit, in the case of Yrisarri v.
Clement,7 the existence of the independence of Chile on evi-
dence, when its independence had not been recognized by the
British government, but on appeal, decision of that question
was not deemed to be material or necessary. But, by a long
line of judicial decisions, the doctrine of the dependence of the
courts upon the executive in this regard has become quite
definitely established, to the extent, at any rate, that the courts
will not concede de facto character to an unrecognized govern-
ment against the known opposition of the executive, or when,
for any reason, such concession would appear to involve danger
of embarrassment to the executive or of international com-
plications.8
4 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 199 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1922).
5 City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347 (1804); Dolder v. Bank
of England, 10 Ves. 352 (1805); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808);
Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 (1818); Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 52 (1819);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415 (1839); United States v. Yorba,
1 Wall. 412 (1863); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890); In re
Cooper, 143 U. S. 677 (1900); Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U. S. 257 (1907).
See also Oliver P. Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the
Federal Courts," (1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485.
6 Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed. Cas. 359 (1819).
7 2 Carr. and Payne 225, 229 (1825). Both these cases are referred to
by Quincy Wright, "Suits Brought by Foreign States with Unrecognized
Governments," 17 Am Jour. Int. Law 742.
8 It should, of course, be understood that in no case does the court
grant any sort of political recognition, that being exclusively an executive
function.
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THE CAPACITY OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS TO SUE IN THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
The Constitution of the United States extends the judicial
power to controversies "between a State, or the citizens thereof,.
and foreign States",9 and it has long been the policy of the
courts, both national and state, to permit foreign governments
which have been recognized by the executive, to sue in order
to protect or enforce their rights as against persons or corpora-
tions10 within the jurisdiction of the court, 11 upon compliance
with certain required conditions.' 2 A similar practice is also
followed by the courts of other countries.' 3
In fact, the New York Supreme Court, in the case of Republic
of Mexico v. De Arrangois,14 went so far as to declare that to
deny a recognized foreign government access to the courts of
the United States "would be something more than a breach of
national comity, and even something more than a violation, if
not of the terms, of the spirit of our Federal Constitution", and
that, "As an arbitrary denial of justice, it would furnish a very
grave subject of remonstrance and complaint, and . . might
9 Art. III.
10 It was indicated in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 (1821),
that the eleventh amendment would not prohibit a suit by a foreign state
in the national courts against one of the states of the Union.
For cases in which the courts have conceded de facto character, that
is, capacity legally to act for the state, in private rights controversies, see
Keene v. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308 (1834); United States v. Home Ins. Co., 22
Wall. 99 (1875); Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570 (1873); Thorington v.
Smith, 8 Wall. 1 (1869). See also Houghton, N. D., "Recognition in Inter-
national Law," 62 American Law Review 228, and "The Validity of the
Acts of Unrecognized de facto governments in courts of non-recognizing
states," (1929) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 216; also Hyneman, Charles S., "Judicial
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment," II Ind. L. Jour. 371; Hervey,
John G., "Legal Effects of Recognition in International Law.
11 See Republic of Mexico v. De Arrangois, 11 How. Pract. 1 (1855),
5 Deur 634 (1856) (N. Y.); King of Prussia v. Kupper, 22 Mo. 550 (1856);
Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310 (1889); State of Yucatan v.
Argumedo, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219 (1915); Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 250 Fed. 341 (1918); Kingdom of Norway v. Federal Sugar
Refining Co., 286 Fed. 188 (1923).
12 They must, for instance, agree to submit themselves as private suit-
ors with respect to set-offs. Wright, Quincy, 17 Aim Jour. Int. Law 742.
See also 25 Col. Law Rev. 556.
13 See Hullett v. King of Spain, 1 Dow. & Cl. 169 (1828); United States
of America v. Wagner, L. R. 1867, 2 Ch. App. 582 (1867).
14 5 Deur 634 (1856).
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even be deemed a just cause for war". But this doctrine of the
absolute privilege of a foreign state to sue does not appear to
be firmly established, the privilege being based rather upon
international comity than upon international law.15
Although, until recent years the question of the capacity of
an unrecognized foreign government to sue in the courts of
another state has seldom arisen, the generally indicated atti-
tude of the courts, both in England and in the United States,
has been that only recognized governments could sue.16 Pro-
fessor Borchard states that the rule permitting recognized for-
eign governments to sue in the courts of the United States does
not establish the converse proposition that unrecognized govern-
ments may not sue.17 However, with one exception,18 unrecog-
nized governments have not been permitted to recover in the
courts of the United States.
In the cases of The Penz and The Tobolsk,19 the Russian
Soviiet Government, in 1921, sought to libel and obtain posses-
sion of two steamers in the possession of the United States.
The United States District Court for the eastern district of
New York held that the Soviet Government, not having been
recognized by the United States, could not sue in the courts of
the United States.
In 1918 a committee of the Commissariat of Public Instruc-
tion of the Soviet Government entered into a contract with one
Cibrario for the purchase of certain motion picture equipment,
and delivered to the American Commercial Attach6 in Petro-
grad a million dollars to be by him deposited in a reputable
bank in the United States. The deposit was subject to drafts
according to specified conditions. The money was deposited in
the National City Bank of New York City. Later, the Soviet
Government commenced an action in the New York courts to
compel Cibrario to account for sums, which, according to the
15 See, for example, the decision of the New York Supreme Court in
Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310 (1889), and of the New York
Court of Appeals in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v.
Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255 (1923).
16 City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347 (1804), and The
Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164 (1871).
17 31 Yale Law Jour. 536.
Is Government of Mexico v. Fernandez, (Mass. 1923) not reported. Dis-
cussed infra, note 27.
19 277 Fed. 91 (1921).
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allegation, he had been obtaining from the deposit through
fraud. The Supreme Court of New York took jurisdiction of
the case, and ordered the appointment of a receiver, on the
ground that the matter was solely contractual, and that the
political status of the plaintiff was immaterial. But the Appel-
late Division 20 reversed the order, holding that, "plaintiff, never
having been recognized as a sovereignty by the executive or
legislative branches of the United States Government, has no
capacity to sue in the courts of this State".
The Court of Appeals2l affirmed the decision of the Appellate
Division on the ground, in part, that the right of a foreign
government to sue, in the courts of the United States, depending
upon international comity, could not be enjoyed by an unrecog-
nized government, since in that case there could be no inter-
national comity as between the United States and the unrecog-
nized government. 22 But the court gave as an additional and
practical reason for its position, the danger of international com-
plications and of possible embarrassment to the national execu-
tive which might result from judicial concession of the right
to sue to unrecognized governments. "More than once during
the last seventy years", said Mr. Justice Andrews, "our rela-
tions with one or another existing but unrecognized government
have been of so critical a character that to permit it to recover
in our courts funds which might strengthen it or which might
even be used against our interests would be unwise. We should
do nothing to thwart the policy which the United States has
adopted." 23  And, "Yet", he added, "unless recognition is the
test of the right [of a foreign government] to sue we do not
2ORussian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 198 N. Y.
App. Div. 869, 1st dept., 191 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1921).
21235 N. Y. 255 (1923).
22 For criticisms of the decision see 31 Yale Law Jour. 534; 35 Harv.
Law Rev. 768; 25 Col. Law. Rev. 551.
23 After the decision of the Appellate Division, the members of the
Commissariat of Education sought to commence an action against Cibrario
as individuals and trustees of an express trust. The New York Supreme
Court refused to take jurisdiction, holding that the officials or agents
of the Soviet Government could have no greater rights than their unrecog-
nized principal. The court stated further, however, that even if the
plaintiffs as individuals had had capacity to sue, the fact that an action
had been brought by the Soviet Government, the beneficiary of their trust,
in its own name, would have terminated and extinguished their right as
agent to bring an action on the same cause. Preobozhenski v. Cibrario, 192
N. Y. Supp. 275 (1922).
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see why Maximilian as emperor of Mexico might not have main-
tained an action [in the courts] here".
A similar point of view was expressed by the United States
District Court for the northern district of California in the
case of The Rogdai.24 In this case the court refused to permit
the Soviet Government to recover by libel a ship which was
admittedly the property of the Russian state, but which was
in the possession of Mr. Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador
appointed by the Kerensky government,25 stating that, "The
question at issue is one of state; it involves international rela-
tions, and is primarily for the State Department. If, as con-
tended by libellants, it be granted that a revolution has .taken
place in Russia, and that the Soviet Republic is in actual con-
trol, the question when, if at all, such de facto government shall
be recognized, is a political one. It involves considerations of
national policy, which are not justiciable, and touching it the
voice of the Chief Executive is the voice, not of a branch of
the government, but of the national sovereignty, equally binding
upon all departments." 26
But the Superior Court of Essex County, Massachusetts, in
May, 1923, in a case involving the capacity of the unrecognized
Obregon government in Mexico to sue, departed from the gen-
eral judicial practice in such cases, though with the tacit
approval of the State Department for the particular case.27 One
24 278 Fed. 294 (1920).
25 It would thus appear that both the inability of an unrecognized
government to sue and the immunity of a foreign state from suit were
involved. See infra.
26 In the case of Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 293 Fed.
133 (1919) ; 293 Fed. 135 (1923), the United States District Court for the
southern district of New York held that Mr. Bakhmeteff, as the recog-
nized "Ambassador of Russia," had authority to commence a suit for
recovery of damages for losses suffered by the state of Russia in the
destruction of certain goods in 1916, belonging to the Imperial Govern-
ment; and that the suit might be continued by Mr. Serge Ughet, Financial
Attach6 of the Russian Embassy, "whose diplomatic status . . . was not
considered to be altered by the termination of the ambassador's duties,"
according to a statement by Secretary Hughes for the information of the
court, dated February 19, 1923.
These decisions are criticised in 23 Col. Law Rev. 787, and Vol. XXV,
p. 552. But, a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition
was denied by the United States Supreme Court, May 12, 1924, withoilt
an opinion. 265 U. S. 573 (1924).
27 Government of Mexico v. Fernandez, (Mass. 1923) not reported.
Discussed by Quincy Wright, 17 Am. Jour. Int. Law 742.
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Fernandez, an employee of the Mexican treasury, left Mexico,
in February, 1923, with a large amount of money belonging to
the United Mexican States. The money was thought to have
been placed in a locked box in the National Bank of Haverhill,
Massachusetts. An attorney appeared in the name of the "Gov-
ernment of Mexico" and obtained a temporary restraining order
forbidding removal of the contents of the box.
Fernandez questioned the right of a representative of an un-
recognized government to appear for Mexico. But, during the
course of the trial, a statement by the United States Depart-
ment of State was introduced to the effect that, "The Govern-
ment of the United States has not accorded recognition to the
administration now functioning in Mexico, and therefore has
at present no official relations with that administration. This
fact, however, does not affect the recognition of the Mexican
state itself, which for years has been recognized by the United
States as an 'international person' as that term is understood
in international practice. The existing situation simply is that
there is no official intercourse between the two states." And
the court, considering the apparently favorable attitude of the
State Department, together with evidence to the effect that the
Obregon government was in effective control of affairs in Mexico,
that it maintained agents in many American cities performing
functions of a consular nature, though without exequaturs, and
that it had a charg6 d'affaires at Washington, who, though not
officially received by the State Department, actually did repre-
sent Mexico, conceded the Obregon government court standing
and continued the restraining order. The court also adverted
to the pending negotiations between the United States and the
Obregon government, which, it was considered, might at any
time result in recognition, 28 giving retroactive standing to the
Obregon government. And in the meantime, to refuse the privi-
lege to sue might, and in fact certainly would, result in loss of
the money which was clearly the property of the Mexican state.29
28 As they did, on August 31, 1923, three months later.
29 The situation in this case was somewhat similar to that in the case
of the State of Yucatan v. Argunedo, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219 (1915), in
which the New York courts permitted representatives of the unrecog-
nized Carranza government to appear in behalf of the State of Yucatan.
There is this difference, -however, in the Argumedo case, the Carranza gov-
ernment had been recognized by the United States as the de facto govern-
ment of Mexico before the case came before the Supreme Court, but after
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The courts have been subjected to some criticism both for
their policy of refusing to permit the Soviet Government to sue,
and the Massachusetts court for its permitting the unrecognized
Obregon government to sue. Professor E. D. Dickinson sees,
in the refusal of the courts to permit unrecognized governments
to appear and seek protection for state property or other public
interests, danger that the country may thereby become involved
in serious international complications, which is the very thing
the courts are trying to avoid.30
On the other hand, Professor Quincy Wright sees danger of
international complications arising from permitting unrecog-
nized governments to sue and recover state property, as was
done in the Fernandez case. While admitting the advantage of
such a policy, in the event that the unrecognized government
so favored ultimately becomes recognized, as was the case with
the Obregon government, Professor Wright points out that, if
.such a government, to which United States courts might extend
such a privilege, and which through a suit should have turned
over to it property belonging to the foreign state, should ulti-
mately fall and never be recognized by the United States, the
succeeding government might, and in fact he believes, would,
hold the United States responsible "for assisting in the con-
version" of the public property of the foreign state.31
Irrespective of the question of the validity of such a claim
by a foreign government, the possibility of its assertion shows
that the danger of international complications from such a situa-
tion must be ever guarded against by the courts. And it must
be obvious that the effectiveness of the executive policy of with-
holding recognition would be seriously affected, if not entirely
destroyed, by permitting an unrecognized government to have
access to the courts of the state withholding recognition.32
Professor Borchard suggests a possible distinction between
cases in which an unrecognized government seeks to sue to
recover or protect property rights which it claims as successor
the starting of the case in the lower courts, the Supreme Court holding the
recognition to be retroactive.
30 He suggests that, unless the courts find some way to give such pro-
tection, it may become necessary to create some sort of federal custodian
for the property of unrecognized governments during the period of non-
recognition. See Dickinson, E. D., "The Unrecognized Government or
State in English and American Law," 22 Mich. Law Rev. 29 if. and 118 ff.
51 17 Am. Jour. Int. Law 744.
82 In this connection, see 38 Har'. Law Rev. 620.
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to a prior government, and cases in which the property rights
involved are claimed by the unrecognized government as being
of its own acquisition. The former, he would agree, may involve
danger of international complications and the courts, he states,
are properly guided in such cases by the fact of recognition or
non-recognition. But with respect to property which is claimed
by an unrecognized government as a result of its own acquisi-
tion, he sees no reason for denying the de facto government
access to the courts for relief in such cases.33
It would seem to be obvious, therefore, whatever difference
of opinion there may be with respect to particular instances,
that a policy of permitting unrecognized governments to sue
in foreign courts would be fraught with possibilities of involv-
ing the executive with embarrassment in the conduct of foreign
relations. And, so long as that situation persists, both the state
courts and the national courts in the United States may be ex-
pected to pursue a conservative policy in such cases, having
regard for the attitude of the Department of State, as they have
in the past.34
IMMUNITY OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS FROM SUIT IN THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
It is a generally accepted rule of international practice that
a sovereign state is immune from suit without its consent in
the courts of foreign states.35 In the United States this prin-
33 Thus Professor Borchard would seem to approve the decisions in
the cases of The Penza, The Tobolsk, and The Rogdai, cited and dis-
cussed supra, while disagreeing, on principle, with the decision in the
Cibrario case. Though, actually, because of the pecliar situation with
respect to the Soviet Government due to the continued recognition of a
representative of a former regime, he does not drastically criticise that
decision. See Borchard, E. M., "Can an Unrecognized Government Sue?"
31 Yale Law Jour. 534.
34 See Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Co. v. American Can Co.,
253 Fed. 152 (1918); The Rogdai, 227 Fed. 294 (1920), 293 Fed. 135
(1923). See also: Government of Mexico v. Fernandez, decided by the
Superior Court of Essex County, Massachusetts, in 1923, cited supra, note
27; and 22 Col. Law Rev. 278.
35 For a statement of the principle of immunity before international
commissions and tribunals, see the advisory opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Eastern Carelia Case, Publications
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, p. 27 (1923).
See also 10 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 195.
See also Scott, J. B., Sovereign States and Suits Before Arbitral Tri-
bunals and Courts of Justice. Chapter VI.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ciple applies alike in both national and state courts,36 and is
practically absolute, extending to proceedings in rem against
commercial ships belonging to, and operated by, a recognized
foreign government.8 7 And, although the immunity has gen-
erally been considered to be based upon international comity
rather than upon international law,38 there appears to be a ten-
dency in recent years on the part of the courts in the United
States to consider that a foreign government enjoys immunity
from suit without its consent as a matter of sovereign right in
international law.8 9
The question of whether or not an unrecognized foreign gov-
ernment is immune from suit in the courts of the United States
has not arisen until within recent years, and the courts had no
precedents upon which to base their decisions in such cases. In
the case of Oliver Trading Co. v. Government of Mexico,4O it
was sought to attach certain property and public funds of the
unrecognized Obregon government, in the state of New York,
on a claim for damages for an alleged breach of a contract by
the Mexican National Railway management. But, like the
Argumedo case,4 ' it was not finally decided until October 11,
1923, after the Obregon government had been recognized by the
United States, and the United States District Court, attributing
retroactive effect to the recognition, vacated the attachment,
which it had previously granted, and declined to exercise further
jurisdiction against the recognized government of a foreign
36 Oliver Trading Co. v. Government of United States of Mexico, 264
U. S. 440 (1924).
37 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Steamship Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562 (1926).
See also Garner, J. W., "Legal Status of Government Ships Employed in
Commerce," 20 Am. Jour. Int. Law 759.
38 See, Angell, E., "Sovereign Immunity-The Modern Trend," 35 Yale
Law Jour. 159; and Hayes, Alfred, "Private Claims Against Foreign Sov-
ereigns," 38 Harv. Law Rev. 599.
See also The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (1812); Rothschild v. Queen of
Portugal, 3 Y. and C. 594 (1839); The Parlement Belge, L. R. 5 P. D. 197
(1878); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897); Mighell v. Sulton
of Johore, 1 Q. B. 149 (1894); Hassard v. United States of Mexico, 173
N. Y. 645 (1903).
39 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); Nankivel
v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150 (1923); Wolfsohn v. Rus-
sian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372 (1923), Discussed
infra.
40 70 N. Y. Law Jour. 209 (1923).
41 Cited and discussed supra, note 29.
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state. In 1924, the Circuit Court of Appeals, to which the case
had been sent by the United States Supreme Court for decision, 42
affirmed the decision of the District Court, without declaring
upon the question of the immunity from suit in case the Mexican
government had not been recognized in the meantime ;43 though
the original action of the District Court, in granting the attach-
ment, would seem to indicate that that court, at any rate, did
not consider an unrecognized government to be immune from
suit.
A similar position was assumed by the New York Supreme
Court in the case of Wolfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republie,44 and sustained by the Appellate Division,
though it was overruled by the Court of Appeals, with the sup-
port of the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiff sought to
sue the Soviet Government for the recovery of certain property
which had been confiscated in Russia. The New York Supreme
Court held that since the Soviet Government had not been recog-
nized by the United States, it could claim no immunity from
suit in the courts of the United States, which it held to be
enjoyed by recognized foreign governments on the basis of
international comity. This view was sustained by the Appellate
Division,45 the court stating that it was "a matter of common
knowledge that the defendant, though not recognized by the
government of the United States, is de facto, at least, the exist-
ing government of Russia. . . . But, being unrecognized
and unacknowledged, it is not entitled to the immunities
accorded to recognized governments. . . . it is a foreign
corporation aggregate, and as such, for the time being because
it is representing the people of Russia, it is a legal entity for
whose acts the nation is responsible. Like a foreign corpora-
tion which has failed to comply with the requirements of the
General Corporation Law and the Tax Law, it cannot sue in
our courts, but may be sued."
This position was, however, overruled by the Court of
Appeals,4 6 holding that a foreign sovereign may not, without
his consent, be brought "before our bar, not because of comity,
but because he has not submitted himself to our laws. Without
42264 U. S. 440 (1924).
435 F. (2d) 659 (1924).
44 192 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1922).
45 195 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1922).
46 234 N. Y. 372 (1923).
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his consent he is not subject to them. Concededly that is so
as to a foreign government that has received recognition. tut
whether recognized or not, the evil of such an attempt would
be the same. 'To cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court
for any complaint against him in his public capacity is contrary
to the law of nations and an insult which he is entitled to resent.'
In either case the hands of the state department would be tied.
Unwillingly it would find itself involved in disputes it might
think unwise. Such is not the proper method of redress if a
citizen of the United States is wronged. The question is a
political one, not confided to the courts but to another depart-
ment of government. Whenever an act done by a sovereign in
his sovereign character is questioned it becomes a matter of
negotiation, or of reprisals, or of war." 48
THE STATUS OF PUBLIC SHIPS OF UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENTS
In the case of The Ambrose Light,49 it was held by the United
States District Court for the southern district of New York
that the war vessels of a revolutionary government which had
not been recognized either as a de facto government, or as hav-
ing belligerent rights, either by the government of the state in
which it was organized 5o or by foreign governments, were
piratical and subject to confiscation. But subsequent recogni-
tion of such a state of affairs by the United States was held to
be sufficient basis for the release of the vessel, with costs assessed
upon the claimants.
47 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918).
48 The United States Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction in
the case, without opinion, citing Oliver Trading Co. v. Government of
Mexico, 264 U. S. 440 (1924), cited supra, note 42. 266 U. S. 580 (1924).
In the case of Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150
(1923), the New York Court of Appeals stated, on authority of decision
in the Wolfsohn case, that the defendant, had it been in existence at the
time the suit was brought, would have been immune from suit, though it
was not recognized. Judgment had been obtained in the lower court in
1922 by default, and the appeal was by third persons who resisted an order
for their examination in supplementary proceedings in aid of the execution
of the judgment. But judicial notice was taken of the fact of the dis-
appearance of the Omsk Government as early as 1920, two years before the
action was started by service upon a Kerensky agent.
4925 Fed. 408 (1885),
50 The ship was commissioned by a revolutionary government in
Colombia.
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In the cases of the Annette and the Doraul the British
Admiralty Division, in 1919, restored two vessels to two
Esthonian subjects, who claimed to be their owners and who
had arrested the vessels by proceedings in rem, over the protest
of the Provisional Government of Northern Russia, which had
requisitioned the ships for its public use. The decision was
based upon the fact that that government had not been recog-
nized by Great Britain. While in the case of the Gagara,52 the
Court of Appeal, affirming a decision of the Admiralty Divi-
sion, declined jurisdiction in a cause involving a vessel which
was in the possession and use of the Esthonian National Council,
which had been recognized by the British Government as a
de facto government.
In the case of the Lomnosof, 53 the Admiralty Division
awarded salvage, in December, 1920, for the rescue of a Rus-
sian ship by British and Belgian officers and soldiers, from the
Bolsheviki at Murmansk upon their taking possession of that
port, which had previously been under control of the Provi-
sional Government of Northern Russia. The decision was based
upon the fact, that, at the time of the rescue, the Soviet Govern-
ment had not been recognized by Great Britain. Hill, J., stated
that,
". ... this court respecting the comity of nations, would never treat as a
meritorious service the act of persons who in defiance of the laws of an
established government, recognized by and in friendship with this coun-
try, took a ship out of the lawful control of such a government. But at
Murmansk on February 21 [1920] there was no government recognized
by this country and indeed no established government at all. There was
for the moment a state of anarchy, during which armed men were taking
possession of all the ships they could get at. It is true that, so far as
I can judge, they were not strictly pirates in the sense that they were
persons who plundered indiscriminately for their own private ends. But,
on the other hand, they were not acting with the authority of a politically
organized society which at the time was recognized by this country. There
is nothing, therefore, in the comity of nations which compels this court to
treat the rescue as a rescue from lawful authority. I hold that the danger
was one to which this court can have regard and a rescue for which this
court can reward. It is not the same as, but it is analogous to. a rescue
from pirates or mutineers, which this court has always recognized as the
subject of salvage." 54
51 L. R. [1919] 105 (1919).
52L. R. [1919] 95 (1919).
53L. R. [1921] 97 (1920).
54 The policy of the courts of the United States in the matter of public
vessels claimed by the Soviet Government has been discussed in connection
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In the foregoing consideration it has been pointed out that
both the British and the American courts have considered them-
selves bound by the action of the executive in respect to recog-
nition or non-recognition of foreign governments, and that no
distinction has ever been recognized by the courts of either
country between the effect of de jure recognition and recogni-
tion of a government simply as a de facto government. It has
also been pointed out that, in the matter of permitting unrecog-
nized governments to sue, the courts have likewise been guided
by the attitude of the executive, with the result, in general, that
unrecognized governments have not been permitted to sue; that
the practice of the courts in this respect has been subjected to
some criticism; that the chief difficulty confronting the judicial
branch in such cases is the danger of involving the executive in
international complications; and, that so long as the situation
continues to involve the possibility of such complications, the
courts may be expected to maintain a conservative attitude. It
has been further indicated that unrecognized governments have
been held to be immune from suits in the courts of the United
States, the principal basis again being the danger of interna-
tional difficulties which might arise from permitting a sovereign
state to be sued without its consent in the courts of a foreign
state, though the public ships of unrecognized governments have
not been held to be immune from judicial process, and British
courts have awarded salvage for the rescue of a vessel from
the possession of the unrecognized Soviet Government.
with the question of the capacity of unrecognized governments to sue.
Supra.
